The Vienna Circle’s reception of Nietzsche by Vrahimis, Andreas
1 
 
The Vienna Circle’s reception of Nietzsche 
 
Andreas Vrahimis (University of Cyprus) 
 
[Final draft, forthcoming in Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy. Submitted on 
15/4/2020. Accepted on 28/7/2020.] 
 
Abstract: Friedrich Nietzsche was among the figures from the history of nineteenth 
century philosophy that, perhaps surprisingly, some of the Vienna Circle’s members had 
presented as one of their predecessors. While, primarily for political reasons, most 
Anglophone figures in the history of analytic philosophy had taken a dim view of 
Nietzsche, the Vienna Circle’s leader Moritz Schlick admired and praised Nietzsche, 
rejecting what he saw as a misinterpretation of Nietzsche as a militarist or proto-fascist. 
Schlick, Frank, Neurath, and Carnap were in different ways committed to the view that 
Nietzsche made a significant contribution to the overcoming of metaphysics. Some of 
these philosophers praised the intimate connection Nietzsche drew between his 
philosophical outlook and empirical studies in psychology and physiology. In his 1912 
lectures on Nietzsche, Schlick maintained that Nietzsche overcame an initial 
Schopenhauerian metaphysical-artistic phase in his thinking, and subsequently remained a 
positivist until his last writings. Frank and Neurath made the weaker claim that Nietzsche 
contributed to the development of a positivistic or scientific conception of the world. 
Schlick and Frank took a further step in seeing the mature Nietzsche as an Enlightenment 
thinker. 
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Since at least as far back as Lou Andreas-Salomé’s Nietzsche from 1894, some scholars have 
detected a “positivist” phase in Nietzsche’s intellectual development.1 This interpretation has 
been debated in various contexts, the most recent being an ongoing scholarly debate 
concerning the precise nature of Nietzsche’s view of natural science.2 This paper will 
examine an intricately connected topic in the history of contemporary philosophy, namely the 
reception of Nietzsche’s thought by the Vienna Circle. Despite usually avoiding the use of 
this etic term as a self-description, the Vienna Circle largely contributed to shaping the 
conception of “positivism” at work in contemporary philosophy, and thereby also the 
conception at stake in the aforementioned debates within Nietzsche scholarship. As I will 
demonstrate in this paper, some of the Vienna Circle’s leading members had interpreted the 
later Nietzsche as a positivist, as engaged in overcoming metaphysics, as an Enlightenment 
thinker, and as contributing to the formation of a scientific conception of the world. 
Though some of Carnap’s,3 Neurath’s,4 and Schlick’s5 reactions to Nietzsche have been 
debated by historians of analytic philosophy, and though some comparisons between them 
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 so far no comprehensive study of these various responses has been 
undertaken. Scholarly focus on individual figures has sometimes resulted in puzzlement: 
why, for example, would someone like Carnap (1959a, 80) refer to Nietzsche in the course of 
presenting how modern logic allows philosophers to overcome metaphysics? Such 
puzzlement is dissolved, as this paper will show, by taking into account all of the passages in 
which Vienna Circle members respond to Nietzsche’s work in similar ways to Carnap. 
In this paper, I will examine Schlick’s, Frank’s, Neurath’s, and Carnap’s various 
discussions of Nietzsche throughout their work. I will demonstrate that the Vienna Circle’s 
members understood Nietzsche in light of a cluster of interrelated theses. The most important 
of these can be formulated as follows: 
 
(N1) Nietzsche was an anti-metaphysical philosopher. 
 
As I will show in what follows, Schlick, Frank, Neurath, and Carnap all endorsed N1, 
interpreting Nietzsche as committed to overcoming metaphysics. A detailed analysis of their 
articulations of N1, however, shows that they each emphasise different aspects of Nietzsche’s 
overcoming of metaphysics. We shall see that Schlick emphasises Nietzsche’s rejection of 
the possibility of knowledge of a “supersensible” (Schlick 2013, 228) world; Frank highlights 
Nietzsche’s psychological and linguistic critique of metaphysical concepts; like Frank, 
Neurath links Nietzsche’s overcoming of metaphysics to his use of psychology, as well as his 
critique of Kantian philosophy; Carnap focuses on Nietzsche’s division of his work between 
empirical studies and poetry. This partly reflects disagreements within the Vienna Circle 
concerning the correct conception of the project of overcoming metaphysics. Clearly there 
are also substantial differences between Nietzsche’s and the Vienna Circle’s members’ 
various conceptions of metaphysics, as well as their proposed methods for its overcoming. 
Although scholars later debated the question of Nietzsche’s commitment to a brand of 
falsificationism,
7
 none of the Vienna Circle’s members explicitly interpreted him as a 
verificationist. Indeed, as I explain in section 4, Schlick presents Nietzsche as committed to 
the thesis that metaphysical statements are false, rather than, as the Vienna Circle’s 
verificationism would have it, meaningless. Thus N1 should be construed broadly as 
indicating an overall critical attitude towards the viability of metaphysics, rather than tied to a 
specific conception of a method for overcoming metaphysics. 
A second thesis which the majority of the abovementioned Vienna Circle members 
explicitly upheld is the following: 
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(N2) Nietzsche’s philosophy was intimately related to the results of specific scientific 
fields, including most prominently psychology. 
 
Interestingly, in most of the relevant writings by the Vienna Circle, N2 is connected to N1. In 
other words, Nietzsche’s overcoming of metaphysics is seen as being accompanied by his 
high estimation of empirical sciences like psychology and physiology. As already noted, 
some of these writings portray Nietzsche as deploying empirical psychological explanations 
in support of the attempt to overcome metaphysics.  
The combination of N1 with N2 is further connected with a third interpretative thesis: 
 
(N3) Nietzsche was a positivist. 
 
Here, I employ the term “positivism” in the very broad sense found in Schlick’s 
methodological and epistemological characterisation of Nietzsche.  As I will show in section 
4, Schlick explicitly takes Nietzsche to be a “positivist” in the sense of being committed to 
the thesis that philosophy has no special method for acquiring knowledge, above or beyond 
the empirical methods of the sciences. If metaphysics is conceived as relying on such special 
methods, this means that N3 is connected to, though it does not necessarily entail, N1.
8
 
Schlick was in fact the only Vienna Circle member to explicitly defend N3. However, Frank 
and Neurath defend the following weaker claim: 
 
(N3*) Nietzsche made significant contributions to the development of a scientific world 
conception. 
 
In other words, Frank and Neurath, as I will show in sections 7 and 8, do not make the bolder 
interpretative claim that Schlick makes, but instead briefly mention the significance of 
Nietzsche’s contributions to the scientific (or “positivistic” (Frank 1970, 232)) outlook that 
they also championed. That Schlick makes the bolder claim (N3), while Frank and Neurath 
limit themselves to weaker claims (N3*) may be explainable by the fact that, as we shall see 
in sections 2-5, Schlick wrote extensively on the interpretation of Nietzsche’s oeuvre, while 
Frank and Neurath did not. Carnap simply does not comment on this subject. 
The fourth interpretative thesis which this paper will explore is the view that 
 
(N4) Nietzsche was an Enlightenment thinker. 
 
Though closely connected to all the above theses, this view was explicitly upheld, as we shall 
see, only by Schlick and Frank. Both Schlick and Frank understood Nietzsche to be an 
Enlightenment thinker insofar as: he rejected metaphysics (N1), he valued the results of 
specific sciences (N2), and he was either a positivist (N3), as Schlick argues, or committed to 
a scientific conception of the world (N3*), as Frank claims. As I show in sections 3-4, 
Schlick saw Nietzsche’s early Schopenhauerian metaphysics as accompanied by a critique of 
the Socratic culture of the Enligthenment. In Schlick’s view, Nietzsche only became a 
proponent of the Enlightenment when he overcame his early metaphysics and embraced a 
scientific world conception. 
Interestingly, N1-N4 broadly align with the types of philosophical views that the Vienna 
Circle outwardly presented as characterising their unified outlook. Inwardly there were, as 
most scholars agree, significant disagreements between the Circle’s members.9 Most 
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importantly, though they were all agreed that this had something to do with some brand of 
verificationism, the manner in which metaphysics was to be overcome (N1) was conceived in 
quite distinct ways by Schlick, Neurath, and Carnap.
10
 In this paper, I focus on the broad 
agreement between Vienna Circle members, and will therefore avoid focussing on what are 
otherwise incredibly significant differences between their positions.
11
 
Though the Vienna Circle’s members did come to see Nietzsche as their predecessor in 
connection to the abovementioned theses, they also objected to specific aspects of 
Nietzsche’s ethics. Carnap’s 1929 lecture notes indicate that he discussed Nietzsche’s 
association with “aristocratic ethics” and “heroism” (Carnap 1922-1933, 33), though the 
notes are inadequate for further determining Carnap’s position on this topic.12 Despite his 
high enthusiasm for Nietzsche’s genius, Schlick (e.g. 1952, 78-79) remained critical of 
Nietzsche’s conception of a Herrenmoral. After Schlick’s death, Waismann (1994a, 1994b) 
would follow suit in presenting some scathing criticisms of Nietzsche’s specific view that the 
members of a ‘master race’ (1994a, 47) should be exempt from all moral strictures. 
Nonetheless, it is important here to specify that such criticisms only concern the positive 
conception of ethics outlined by Nietzsche. Other aspects of Nietzsche’s ethics and 
metaethics, especially his critique of morality, influenced some Vienna Circle members.
13
 
The Vienna Circle’s accounts of Nietzsche are at odds with the vehement rejections of 
Nietzsche’s thought developed by other significant figures in the history of analytic 
philosophy. The latter were largely a result of Nietzsche’s association with political positions 
to which the majority of Anglophone analytic philosophers were opposed.
 
 At the outset of 
the First World War, British propaganda had portrayed Nietzsche as responsible for 
Germany’s amoral militarism.14 As Akehurst (2010, 18-25, 55-58, 69-70, 96, 101-104) has 
shown, these outcries shaped the Anglophone analytic reaction to Nietzsche. Already during 
the interwar, Russell would claim that “Hitler’s ideals come mainly from Nietzsche” (quoted 
in Akehurst 2010, 1). Russell repeats this claim in his popular History of Western Philosophy 
(1946, e.g. 667, 746), though there he clarifies that Nietzsche was neither a nationalist nor an 
anti-Semite (791-792). The most direct point of contrast to Nietzsche’s reception by 
Anglophone analytic philosophers is found in Schlick’s work. In 1914, Schlick (2013, 77-87) 
defended Nietzsche against the British propagandists’ charge of militarism, and again during 
the 1930s against the far-right militaristic appropriation of Nietzsche (1952, 77-79).
15
 
Another important case in point relates to Neurath, who in 1944-1945 had co-published with 
Joseph Lauwerys a series of papers arguing that Plato’s Republic should be banned from 
education in post-war Germany, as fascists could use them to propagate their ideas.
16
 Their 
work predated, and influenced, similar political attacks by Russell and Popper against figures 
from the history of philosophy. Yet contrary to Russell (1946), Neurath and Lauwerys’ 
(1944, 1945) heated polemic against Plato and other philosophers refrained from making 
political accusations against Nietzsche. Instead, they contained their commentary to a brief 
chastisement of Nietzsche’s portrayal of ‘the resemblance of his own ideas with those of 
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Frederic II’ (Neurath and Lauwerys 1944, 575).  By contrast to Russell and other Anglophone 
analytic philosophers, Schlick, and in part Neurath, resisted the far-right’s misappropriation 
of Nietzsche. There were, however, contrasting opinions within the Circle.
17
 Carnap’s 1918 
notes indicate that he conceded the propagandists’ view of Nietzsche, classifying him 
alongside Heraclitus and Thrasymachus as an individualistic defender of “perpetual war”, 
conceived “as a moral necessity” (Carnap 1918, 17).18 Feigl (1981, 383) also briefly mentions 
Nietzsche as a militarist in 1952. 
It is unlikely that either Carnap or Feigl had read Schlick’s 1914 addendum to his lecture 
notes, in which he develops detailed objections to Nietzsche’s portrayal as a militarist. In 
fact, Schlick’s early work, where we find the most extensive treatment of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy by a member of the Vienna Circle, has until recently been overlooked by 
scholars.
19
 Schlick’s defence of Nietzsche in his Rostock lecture notes was only published in 
2013, while most of his early work has not been translated into English. This in part explains 
why the Vienna Circle’s reception of Nietzsche, and in particular Schlick’s major 
contribution in shaping it, has so far been inadequately studied. This article aims to rectify 
this omission. 
 
1. SCHLICK’S READING OF NIETZSCHE 
 
Among the Vienna Circle’s members, Schlick was clearly the most avid admirer of 
Nietzsche’s work (and though the others may have agreed with him concerning N1-N4, it is 
unlikely that they shared his level of enthusiasm). Schlick’s first readings of Nietzsche date 
back to 1898, when as a 16-year-old Gymnasium student he began to be interested in 
philosophy (Iven 2013b, 55). Like many teenagers after him, he enthusiastically discovered 
Nietzsche (Iven 2013a, 17-18; 2013b, 55), and swiftly began reading first Zarathustra and 
then Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (Iven 2013a, 18). He would later note in his (unpublished) 
autobiography that during his lifetime no other book would “so shake and enrapture [him] as 
much as Zarathustra” (quoted in Iven 2013a, 18, my translation), while elsewhere he thanks 
Nietzsche for causing in him “so many tears of high enthusiasm” (quoted in Iven 2013a, 18, 
my translation). As Iven (2013b, 61-63) points out, Schlick’s unpublished manuscripts even 
contain an undated prose-poem emulating Nietzsche’s writing style, in which his protagonist 
engages in dialogue with Nietzsche’s Zarathustra character.20 
One of the earliest scholarly acknowledgements of Schlick’s influence by Nietzsche 
occurs in a 1938 memoir, where Feigl writes that 
 
Without more accurate biographical reference-points, it is difficult to establish which 
influences had the most effect on Schlick’s work. As regards his philosophy of life, in 
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particular, I would hardly venture to name anyone apart from Guyau, Nietzsche and 
Ruskin. (1979, xix-xx). 
 
Feigl goes on to oppose his estimation of Nietzsche’s influence on Schlick’s “philosophy of 
life” with other influences on his “theoretical philosophy”. Though the division between 
these two aspects of Schlick’s work is not entirely mistaken, the degree to which Nietzsche 
influenced Schlick exceeds the boundaries Feigl’s division sets. As will become clear in our 
study of sources unavailable to Feigl at the time, Schlick’s early Nietzschean concerns would 
continue to shape not only his philosophy of life and culture, but also his conceptions of 
ethics and epistemology. As Mormann (2010, 270-271) and Ferrari (2016) have shown, 
Problems of Ethics restates in a more sober tone various Nietzschean themes from Schlick’s 
earlier Lebensweisheit. As I will show in section 6, Nietzsche’s influence is also felt in 
Schlick’s epistemology, in connection with his consistent account of the value of knowledge 
throughout his work. Nietzsche’s influence continues throughout Schlick’s work, from his 
1908 Lebensweisheit to his last unfinished book Natur und Kultur. 
In what follows, I will divide my discussion of Schlick’s responses to Nietzsche into two 
parts. In the first part (sections 2-5), I will discuss Schlick’s manner of interpreting Nietzsche, 
as it is presented in the course of his 1912-1923 lectures at the University of Rostock. 
Schlick’s primary task here concerns the exposition of Nietzsche’s thought as he interprets it, 
without explicitly connecting it to his own philosophical views. In the second part (section 6), 
I will address the ways in which Nietzsche, now seen through the prism of the interpretation 
offered in the Rostock lectures, influenced Schlick’s philosophical work, both in his early 
realist phase and after his turn to positivism during his Vienna years. The interpretation of 
Nietzsche found in Schlick’s lectures also sheds some light on other responses to Nietzsche 
by the Vienna Circle’s members (which I examine in sections 7-9). 
 
2. SCHLICK’S NIETZSCHEAN EXPOSITION OF NIETZSCHE 
 
In Nietzsche’s work one can find a unique approach to the historiography of philosophy, 
which Schlick applies in his historical study of Nietzsche himself. In various places, 
Nietzsche (e.g. 2002, 6-7; 1996, 109-110) would analyse philosophical ideas as resulting 
from physiological drives, often unconscious, and explainable by means of physiology (e.g. 
by reference to dietary habits). Nietzsche thus conceives of the history of philosophy as 
inextricably connected to philosophers’ lives. A Nietzschean history of philosophy would 
look to philosophers’ biographies, not simply for their “valuations”, but also for the drives 
that underlie them. Schlick’s Rostock lectures take what can thus be understood as a 
Nietzschean approach to the thinker’s life and work, by presenting one alongside the other.21 
In fact, Schlick (2013, 102-106) justifies his method by arguing that a complete 
understanding of Nietzsche’s ideas could only emerge from an understanding of his life. 
Thus, for example, aside from a number of other biographical details, Schlick pays close 
attention to Nietzsche’s state of health. Schlick uses references to Nietzsche’s illness in 
explaining the fact that he spent a phase in which, being unable to work for extended periods 
of time, he wrote only fragments (2013, 240-242). Schlick also enters the perhaps unfortunate 
debate over whether Nietzsche’s final collapse can be detected in some of his last works. 
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Schlick (296) rejects Möbius’ diagnosis that Nietzsche’s pronouncements of his discovery of 
the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence (forgetting the origins of this doctrine e.g. in Stoicism) 
were a symptom of his mental illness. Schlick (317-318) nonetheless thinks that the lack of 
inhibition and self-praise that characterises Nietzsche’s last works is a first sign of his 
subsequent collapse.  
Schlick (2013, 99-101, 366-371) makes it clear that he does not rank Nietzsche among the 
Great Philosophers, nor does he think that this detracts from the value of his work.
22
 
Nietzsche was not a system-builder, and did not attempt to develop a series of interconnected, 
coherent, original solutions to the basic problems of philosophy.
23
 In most cases, according to 
Schlick, Nietzsche simply adopted or reworked positions which had already been developed 
in the context of earlier philosophical debates. For example, as shown in section 3, Schlick 
takes Nietzsche to have started out as a Schopenhauerian, and thus to have simply expanded 
Schopenhauer’s outlook by applying it to the objects of his philological studies. When he 
later overcame his early Schopenhauerian leanings, many of Nietzsche’s new philosophical 
positions simply rearticulated views that were originally put forth by earlier nineteenth 
century positivists. 
The fact, however, that most of Nietzsche’s answers to the traditional problems of 
philosophy are not highly original does not otherwise diminish Schlick’s appraisal of him. 
Schlick plainly considers Nietzsche to be a genius.
24
 Schlick first of all notes that, even 
though his positions had already been developed in previous debates, Nietzsche was a genius 
insofar as he was able to bring them together, connect them to the philosophy of culture, and 
articulate them with unprecedented passion. Schlick has high praise for Nietzsche’s style, and 
agrees with his own estimation that he was one of the greatest innovators in the German 
language after Luther and Goethe (2013, 301-302).
25
 Yet Schlick (2013, 100-101) insists that 
Nietzsche should not thereby be understood as being only a great poet. Although Nietzsche is 
not a great system-builder, he is nonetheless immensely significant as a philosopher of 
culture. 
Schlick conceives of changes in culture as resulting from gradual processes which may 
take millennia. Juxtaposed to this, Schlick talks of those rare few solitary individuals who 
single-mindedly rise up against the tide in attempting to overcome their own culture, 
effecting drastic changes. In 1911, a year before writing his Nietzsche lectures, Schlick had 
expressed this idea in what appears to be a criticism of Nietzsche’s conception of “the 
transvaluation of values” (1979b, 115). Schlick argues that Nietzsche’s account of “that great 
process on which all advances in culture and the conception and quality of life depend” (115) 
mistakenly sees it in individualistic terms, as a sudden change. Instead, in Schlick’s view, 
transvaluation 
 
is a constantly advancing process, slowly and inexorably occurring everywhere, which 
only occasionally receives a slight change in velocity or direction due to quite exceptional 
personalities and events, a change whereby particular epochs of cultural history, or of 
history generally, then become separable from each other. (Schlick 1979b, 115). 
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Interestingly, Schlick’s list of historical “transvaluation-periods” (115) includes, after the 
Renaissance and the Reformation, “the dawn of a scientifically grounded world-outlook” 
(115). The same picture of the long durée involved in the transformation of values and 
cultures is conjured at the outset of Schlick’s 1912 Nietzsche lectures (2013, 88-91). Here, he 
concedes that Nietzsche was in fact one of those exceptional figures who manage to stand 
above the long historical tide, and effect drastic changes in their culture (2013, 91-92). 
The 1911 text states something also intimated by the 1912 lectures, and which will later be 
repeated by other Vienna Circle members in upholding N3*: namely that Nietzsche's genius 
is connected to the emergence of a “scientifically grounded world-outlook” (115). In 1912, 
Schlick (2013, e.g. 92) highlights the extent to which Nietzsche’s views, radical for his time, 
had already come to be commonplace during the twentieth century.
26
 Schlick (e.g. 2013, 325-
328) thinks that Nietzsche looked too far ahead into the future, and thus his efforts were 
doomed to failure during his own lifetime. 
 
3. THE TRIPARTITE DIVISION OF NIETZSCHE’S PHASES: THE ARTISTIC-
METAPHYSICAL PHASE 
 
Like many of his contemporary Nietzsche scholars influenced by Andreas-Salomé (1894), 
Schlick divides Nietzsche’s work into the following three phases: (i) an early metaphysical 
phase under the influence of Schopenhauer and Wagner, (ii) an early positivist phase 
characterised by the overcoming of metaphysics and an appreciation of science, and (iii) a 
later development of a non-metaphysical account of the value of life from within the 
strictures of positivism. In what follows, I will elaborate on each phase as presented by 
Schlick, beginning with Nietzsche’s early metaphysical phase. 
In intertwining a biographical account with an attempt to comprehend his oeuvre, Schlick 
begins by describing Nietzsche’s and his family’s life (2013, 107-120). He then covers 
Nietzsche’s career as a scholar from a fairly young age (120-128), e.g. in establishing a 
philological study group with his classmates at the age of 16 (120-121). He eventually 
presents Nietzsche’s early work as tied to his career as a philologist (128-132). Schlick also 
gives an account of how Nietzsche came under the heavy influence of Schopenhauer (132-
144) and Wagner (144-151). Schlick thinks that, by idolizing these men as his heroes, 
Nietzsche conjured up an idealized image of his own self, which inevitably led to 
disappointment when contrasted with reality (e.g. 209). This disappointment marks the end of 
the first phase in Nietzsche’s work. As I explain in section 4, Schlick (139-140) detects a 
philosophical critique of Schopenhauer as latent quite early on in Nietzsche’s intellectual 
development, but presents him as suppressing such criticisms in his writings until his 
subsequent overcoming of Schopenhauerian metaphysics. By contrast, Schlick (202, 208-
211) presents Nietzsche’s disillusionment about Wagner as something closer to shock 
effected by Nietzsche’s discovery of Wagner’s mystical leanings. Nietzsche’s visit to 
Bayreuth for the rehearsals of the Ring Cycle in 1876 is presented as the catalyst for 
shattering the ideal image of Wagner. 
Given the idolization described above, Schlick thinks that Nietzsche’s philosophical 
contributions during this period are not highly original, but rather minute modifications of the 
Schopenhauerian outlook. Apart from other minor philological studies, the major work of this 
artistic-metaphysical phase is The Birth of Tragedy, which Schlick presents as an application 
of Schopenhauer’s insights to an analysis of culture. Nietzsche’s philosophical outlook 
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towards culture is here characterised by a deeply critical view of the enlightenment. This is 
how Schlick interprets Nietzsche’s understanding of the contrast between the balancing of the 
Dionysian and Apollonian in Aeschylus and Sophocles, on the one hand, and on the other 
hand Euripides’ Socratic destruction of that balance. 
Schlick presents Nietzsche as equating the Enlightenment to Socratic culture. Schlick thus 
thinks that the The Birth of Tragedy sees this Enlightenment Socratic culture as guided by a 
“will to knowledge”, which Nietzsche denigrates. According to Schlick, Nietzsche’s goal 
during his early “romantic” (2013, 205) artistic-metaphysical phase is to overcome the 
Socratic-Enlightenment culture. Schlick clarifies that Nietzsche does not hold that such an 
overcoming can be effected through regressing to an ancient Dionysian culture. Rather, 
Nietzsche proposes that the Enlightenment’s “will to knowledge” will be overcome through 
art, and more specifically through what he sees as Wagner’s Schopenhauerian approach to 
art. 
This topic is further discussed in Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations. Its essays belong to 
the artistic-metaphysical phase, since Nietzsche is still addressing themes and problems that 
arise from within a broadly Schopenahauerian framework. Nietzsche, for example, still 
attacks the Enlightenment “will to knowledge”, both in his critique of David Strauss as a 
Bildungsphilister (Schlick 2013, 185-192), and in his criticisms of the “idle stroller in the 
garden of knowledge” as developed in “The Use and Abuse of History for Life” (Schlick 
2013, 192-198). In the last two Meditations, Schlick detects some elements of Nietzsche’s 
thought that gradually prepare for the second anti-metaphysical stage. In “Schopenhauer as 
educator”, for example, Schlick (2013, 198-202) sees Nietzsche as portraying an idealized 
version of his former master’s genius, and this ends up bearing little resemblance to 
Schopenhauer himself (Schlick 2013, 198-199). The same applies to his praise of Wagner 
(2013, 202-203), written right before Nietzsche’s visit to Bayreuth finalized his 
disillusionment with both his heroes. Having bid farewell to both, as Schlick sees it (207-
209), Nietzsche would move on to his positivist phase. 
 
4. OVERCOMING METAPHYSICS: NIETZSCHE’S POSITIVIST TURN 
 
Nietzsche’s middle period, according to Schlick (e.g. 2013, 204), thus begins with 
Nietzsche’s final overcoming of his Schopenhauerian metaphysics. The middle period covers 
over the production of three important works, Human all too Human, Daybreak, and The 
Joyful Wisdom (2013, 205). In Schlick’s parallel biographical account (2013, 211-227, 243-
248, 254-260, 266-276), the anti-metaphysical turn not only coincides, as we have seen, with 
a detachment from the influence of his “heroes”, but also with a period in which Nietzsche’s 
health rapidly deteriorates. The state of Nietzsche’s health makes him incredibly sensitive to 
changes in climate, and as Schlick notes, Nietzsche continuously seeks environments where 
the climatic conditions allow his pains to pause (2013, 225). Schlick points out that the state 
of his health not only will gradually force Nietzsche to abandon his academic career, but also 




Nietzsche’s overcoming of Schopenhauer’s influence, in Schlick’s account, consists 
primarily of the liberation of his philosophical thinking from metaphysics. Schlick (2013, 
139-140) thinks that Nietzsche already formed doubts about Schopenhauerian metaphysics 
quite early on through the influence of his reading of Lange (2013, 139-144). Nietzsche had, 
nonetheless, refused to shake off Schopenhauer’s system until much later in his career. 
Schlick finds evidence of this in Nietzsche’s correspondence with Gersdorff in 1866, where 
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he expresses such Langian criticisms, but still finds ways to answer them. According to 
Schlick, Nietzsche had seen that metaphysics “has no scientific value at all […] but was to be 
regarded entirely as art, as concept-poetry” (2013, 139, my translation). Furthermore, he 
understood that 
 
metaphysics cannot be attacked by logical objections either.  
“Who wants,” he writes to Gersdorff, 1866, “to refute a movement by Beethoven, and who 
wants to accuse Raphael's Madonna of a mistake?” (Schlick 2013, 139, my translation) 
 
It is interesting that Schlick reproduced this specific passage from Nietzsche’s 
correspondence, in which he clarifies that artistic modes of expression are not candidates for 
verification. Schlick’s lecture notes do not clarify that Nietzsche’s reference to Beethoven 
and Raphael is a quote from Lange, but only notes that Nietzsche came to question 
Schopenhauer due to his reading of Lange’s Geschichte des Materialismus. The example of 
verifying Beethoven’s music, as we shall see in section 9, is the precise example that Carnap 
(1959a, 80) uses. Though Carnap does attribute this anti-metaphysical attitude to Nietzsche, 
he quotes neither Nietzsche’s letter nor Lange’s book. Thus though, as we shall see, Carnap 
and Schlick are aligned in seeing Nietzsche as anticipating the overcoming of metaphysics, it 
is difficult to conclusively ascertain whether Carnap was directly influenced by (Schlick’s 
knowledge of) Nietzsche’s correspondence, by his reading of Lange, or by both.28 
According to Schlick, Nietzsche’s attempt to defend Schopenhauer’s metaphysics as a 
kind of Langian “concept-poetry” eventually falters. Nietzsche frees himself from 
metaphysics by rejecting the idea that truth or falsehood can be in any way relevant to 
emotional needs (Schlick 2013, 228). According to Schlick, Nietzsche’s middle phase is 
marked by a rejection of metaphysics, defined as any doctrine about a “supersensible” (228) 
world underlying phenomena; this is how Schlick understands Nietzsche’s commitment to 
N1 above. Defined thus, metaphysical systems “are not simply unprovable, but surely false” 
(Schlick 2013, 228, my translation). In Schlick’s account, Nietzsche now admits of no other 
knowledge other than that given by the senses, and whose truth is discovered by science. 
Nietzsche, according to Schlick, is a positivist in the following sense: he thinks “the methods 
of thought of the rigorous sciences” (2013, 229, my translation) are the only methods of 
acquiring knowledge, and that “philosophy has no other method at its disposal” (229, my 
translation). Schlick is thus committed to N3 (and furthermore sees it as intimately connected 
to N1). In this middle period, according to Schlick (e.g. 2013, 234, 249-250, 261), Nietzsche 
conceives of knowledge as the highest good, which is pursued, in a scientific manner, for its 
own sake, and which brings joy to the knower (249-250). In Schlick’s view, Nietzsche 
presents metaphysics as an attempt to “artificially embellish science” (2013, 250, my 
translation) which he compares to the attempt to ornamentally beautify nature in Rococo 
gardens. He goes on to add: 
 
but just as nature is more beautiful than any garden, so genuine science is more beautiful 




Thus during the middle phase, Nietzsche’s former enthusiasm for artistic creation is toned 
down. Nietzsche’s newly found appreciation of scientific rigour explains his high praise for 
the significance of psychology, physiology, and evolutionary biology during both his middle 
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and later phases, and he appeals to psychological explanations of aesthetic phenomena 
(Schlick, 2013, 230-231). In this way, Schlick presents Nietzsche’s commitment to N3 and 
N1 as connected to N2. Nietzsche’s Schopenhauerian estimation of Genius is also put on hold 
(Schlick 2013, 232). By extension, while Nietzsche had previously raised art above 
knowledge in attacking the Socratic culture of the Enlightenment, during his middle phase he 
reappraises this former rejection. This is evidenced, for example, in the high praise for 
Socrates that we encounter in Nietzsche’s work during this phase (2013, 234-236).30 Thus 
Schlick is committed to N4, seeing the later Nietzsche as transformed from a critic of the 
Enlightenment to its proponent. As outlined above, Schlick understands how Nietzsche 
become a proponent of the Enlightenment in terms of his overcoming of metaphysics (N1) 
and the accompanying positivistic (N3) emphasis on the value of scientific knowledge (N2).  
 
5. FROM WISSENSCHAFT TO LIFE: NIETZSCHE’S THIRD PHASE 
 
In Schlick’s conception of Nietzsche’s three phases, the developments that bring the second 
phase towards an end merge organically with the outset of the third phase (2013, 276-277). In 
Schlick’s estimation (2013, 277), the change from the second to the third phase is not one in 
Nietzsche’s theoretical orientation, but in some of his specific practical valuations. Schlick 
(e.g. 240-241, 276-277) insists that Nietzsche does not revert to his former metaphysical 
romanticism, and that nothing in his later work contradicts the basic theoretical principles of 
his positivism. Nietzsche remains a committed positivist (N3), and revises neither his 
rejection of metaphysics (N1), nor his limitation of the knowable to what is given by the 
senses (e.g. Schlick 2013, 280-284).  
In Schlick’s account, the specific philosophical view which Nietzsche revises during the 
shift from the second to the third phase concerns his estimation of the value of knowledge. 
While in the second phase Nietzsche upholds knowledge as an absolute value, the third phase 
is characterised by a relativisation of the value of knowledge. In this third phase, Nietzsche 
sees the value of knowledge as determined by the demands of life. Life is now conceived as 
an unanalysable, irreducible, absolute value. The mature Nietzsche sees that knowledge is 
only a small part of life; it is valuable only insofar as it ultimately serves life (Schlick 2013, 
277-278). (This, as we shall see, is a view which Schlick will negotiate in his own conception 
of the value of knowledge.) Thus, according to Schlick, Nietzsche’s emphasis shifts away 
from knowledge and towards value. Nonetheless, Schlick argues that the correct way to see 
Nietzsche’s later phase is as a non-metaphysical attempt to develop this axiological project 
(what he calls the “transvaluation of all values”) from within the positivist theoretical 
framework that he had already accepted in the second phase. 
Nietzsche’s final period, according to Schlick, emerges with Zarathustra’s turn to life 
itself as the highest value, determining and shaping even the will to knowledge. Schlick 
thinks of Zarathustra as an unsurpassed masterpiece, in which Nietzsche reaches a peak of 
his creative powers that the remainder of his later works fail to attain. Zarathustra is 
Nietzsche’s masterpiece primarily because it reaches a state of equilibrium between the 
content and the medium in which it is expressed, namely poetry. Schlick (2013, 300-304) has 
nothing but high praise for the exalted language of the book, and presents it as being 
unquestionably a work of genius. Though Nietzsche’s later attempts to defend Zarathustra’s 
outlook in a more systematic manner (in what he had published of his unfinished The Will to 
Power) are clearly works of genius, they pale in comparison to Zarathustra (2013, 311-312). 
Schlick argues that in these works Nietzsche fails to articulate the fundamental insights of 
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Zarathustra precisely because they are attempts to present in a theoretical manner views that 
are best expressed poetically (e.g. 2013, 278, 311). (As I will show in section 9, by contrast to 
Schlick, Carnap had interpreted the later Nietzsche’s work as neatly divided between poetry 
and empirical studies. Schlick’s 1912 lecture notes nonetheless partly prefigure Carnap’s 
similar claims about metaphysics as being the result of attempts to express in a theoretical 
medium things that are best expressed as art or poetry.) 
Schlick defends his view that the mature Nietzsche remains a positivist by opposing 
metaphysical interpretations of his work. In other words, Schlick thinks Nietzsche is 
committed to both N3 and N1 throughout his middle and later periods. In order to defend this 
view, Schlick must show that Nietzsche remains within the theoretical strictures set out by his 
earlier positivism. Schlick is therefore at pains to show that some of Nietzsche’s concepts that 
deceptively appear to be metaphysical, such as his doctrine of eternal recurrence and his view 
of the Übermensch, are in fact consistent with his anti-metaphysical (N1) positivism (N3). 
Schlick argues that the doctrine of eternal recurrence, which Zarathustra proclaims as a 
central component of his teaching, is not a metaphysical idea (2013, 298). Nietzsche’s own 
positivistic strictures allow this view. The doctrine makes no reference to a supersensible 
world beyond experience, but only refers to something which could not possibly be 
experienced. Schlick thus claims that a broader conception of metaphysics, which covers over 
anything that could not possibly be experienced, is required if one is to claim that Nietzsche 
has fallen back into metaphysics here. As Schlick (2013, 298) notes, in unpublished 
documents Nietzsche made a failed attempt to prove his thesis on the basis of physics and 
cosmology. Schlick (2013, 298-299) proposes that the thesis is in fact a kind of speculative 
naturalistic view, which remains a possibility that is as yet neither provable nor unprovable 
by contemporary physics. It gives rise to no logical contradiction. Schlick nonetheless 
questions how such a view would have any consequence other than being “a symbolic 
representation of the eternal value of life” (2013, 299, my translation), as it seems to make no 
empirical difference: to whoever lives it, a life that has already had manifold recurrences will 
still be new. 
Schlick further rejects the idea that the notion of the Übermensch was originally intended 
by Nietzsche as a metaphysical concept. Schlick (2013, 284-285) does concede that 
Nietzsche was not consistent in his original non-metaphysical view, and misuses the concept 
in his some of his less careful last works. Schlick (2013, 284) interprets Nietzsche’s concept 
of the “Übermensch” as an evolutionary biological concept. Schlick (2013, 284) cites 
Nietzsche’s first deployment of the concept in Zarathustra, which he thinks clarifies that 
humans evolved from apes, and the Übermensch will evolve from humans. Schlick very 
briefly contrasts the blind natural evolution of species to the “conscious” (2013, 284) 
production of the Übermensch through a process of education [“Höherbildungsprocess” 
(284)] and even of breeding [“Höherzüchtung” (286)]. 
Schlick’s biological conception of the Übermensch may seem deceptively close to some 
form of eugenics (i.e. the attempt to influence the evolution of the human species by the 
application of selective breeding).
31
 However, what Schlick has in mind is better clarified in 
his earlier Lebensweisheit (90), which distinguishes, in Nietzschean terms, between “all-too-
human” [Allzumenschliche] and “overhuman” [Übermenschliche] drives. Schlick’s account 
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here seems merely descriptive, insofar as he defines Allzumenschliche drives as those which 
are currently being overcome, while Übermenschliche drives are those which will become 
more powerful in future humans. In Schlick’s account, education would thus play a role in 
strengthening or weakening certain drives, which thereby affect the biological future of the 
human species.
32
 This connects to Nietzsche’s project of the transvaluation of all values, as 
the affirmation of new values is what will create, through habituation, the Übermenschliche 
drives of the future. This explanation, of course, does not clear Schlick of all charges, since 
without further inspection of Schlick’s earlier writings, his lecture notes remain ambiguous, 
and could easily leave their reader with the false impression that he approvingly interprets 
Nietzsche as defending eugenics! 
 
6. NIETZSCHE’S INFLUENCE ON SCHLICK 
 
What I have outlined above concerns Schlick’s exposition of Nietzsche’s thought in his 
Rostock lectures, i.e. in what is primarily a historically-minded enterprise. Though Schlick 
does defend a number of interesting interpretative theses on Nietzsche (N1-N4), and does 
often pause to evaluate some of his views, he does not directly connect Nietzsche to his own 
philosophical positions. In what follows, I will proceed to examine how aspects of 
Nietzsche’s thought influenced Schlick’s positions on ethics, epistemology, and his 
connected conceptions of play and the meaning of life. 
Interestingly, in the Rostock lectures Schlick presents Nietzsche as a “positivist” at a time 
when Schlick himself had not yet become one. Before his conversion to positivism in 1922 
through his contact with the Vienna Circle, Schlick had espoused a brand of realism (usually 
categorised as either “critical” or “structural” realism). Schlick’s early work is crucially 
opposed to the most prominent positivistic philosophy of science of his time, i.e. Machian 
“empiriocriticism”.33 The early Schlick does subscribe to a broadly Machian (and 
Nietzschean) conception of drive-psychology, which I will go on to discuss in more detail. 
His major disagreement with Mach concerns not practical, but theoretical philosophy, and 
mainly epistemology. Against the Machian explanation of knowledge by reference to a 
uniform account of the drive to pleasure, Schlick argues for the autonomy of Wissenschaft.
34
 
Nonetheless, in reacting against Mach, Schlick finds an ally in Nietzsche. As will become 
clear after we further analyse Schlick’s conceptions of play and the value of “joyful” 
knowledge, Schlick will follow Nietzsche into what, in the Rostock lectures, he had 
designated as the third phase of his oeuvre. 
Apart from the Rostock lectures, Schlick’s clearest dialogue with Nietzsche occurs in his 
1908 Lebensweisheit. This peculiar book offers a clear example of the unresolved tension 
between Schlick’s more sober technical work and his poetic leanings. Schlick’s influence by 
Nietzsche is displayed not only in numerous doctrines he puts forward, but also in the style of 
his writing. Schlick swiftly moves from neurobiological explanations of the workings of the 
human brain (e.g. 2006, 50-51) to emotional flourishes, often punctuated by exclamation 
marks, e.g. on the meaning of love (289-332). Schlick’s partly Nietzschean style has been 
described as “involuntarily comic” (Mormann 2010, 268) or “purple prose” (Uebel 2020, 
144). 
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As Mormann (2015, 419-420) points out, there were a number of contemporary 
Germanophone philosophers who had responded to Nietzsche’s Schopenhauerian notion of 
the “will to power” by adapting it to their own frameworks, e.g. Vaihinger’s “will to 
illusion”, or Rickert’s “will to system”. Schlick similarly reworks this broadly 
Schopenhauerian and Nietzschean notion into his own evolutionary conception of a “will to 
pleasure”.35 In Schlick’s account, the “will to pleasure” is the drive which governs all spheres 
of human activity pertaining to the attainment of practical ends. According to Schlick’s 
Nietzschean (and partly Machian) psychology of drives, all values are determined by such a 
will.
36
 We have already seen how Schlick, within this context, develops an account of the 
struggle between contesting drives, in relation to which he interprets the Nietzschean concept 
of the Übermensch. 
Schlick’s main aim in this book is to formulate a typology of the forms the “will to 
pleasure” takes. This drive manifests itself in different forms, some purely bodily and some 
mental. Thus, for example, Schlick (2006, 108-123) distinguishes between mere civilization, 
which looks to the satisfaction of mere bodily needs, and a kind of utopian Kultur which 
seeks to effect mental joy, and ultimately a way of living in harmony with nature.
37
 
Rising above mere bodily needs, the “will to pleasure” develops into a “will to beauty” 
(2006, 155-170) that drives art and aesthetic appreciation, and into the “will to truth” (170-
181) which determines scientific knowledge. Especially in relation to the latter, Schlick (e.g. 
170-171) conceived of a strict separation between two possible ways of approaching an 
object in the world, one pertaining to values, the other pertaining to facts. According to 
Schlick, values are pertinent to the ways in which we approach any object in relation to 
specific practical ends. Such valuations involve no real scientific knowledge [Wissenschaft]. 
Knowledge, as Schlick conceives it, has a purely theoretical character, which presupposes an 
indifference to the practical value of the object under examination. Thus, Schlick thought that 
Wissenschaft is not subjugated to practical ends, but is a purely theoretical type of knowledge 
driven by the “will to truth”. 
Though autonomous from practical goals, the “will to truth” is not completely disengaged 
from them. Schlick (2006, 155-170) has an evolutionary account of the emergence, in various 
stages, of the “will to truth” from the “will to pleasure”. Before the emergence of a “will to 
truth”, humans (like all other animals) are simply motivated by the drive towards pleasure. At 
this stage, according to Schlick, one cannot speak of knowledge, since the drive towards 
pleasure guides only valuations for practical purposes. Schlick follows Mach in showing how 
it is useful for humans to make predictions conducive to particular practical ends.
38
 Specific 
predictions, however successful, are nonetheless insufficient for Wissenschaft. A further stage 
is necessary, involving a notion of play (2006, 143-155) that, as we will see, remains central 
throughout Schlick’s later work.39 Schlick (2006, 171) imagines a scenario in which all other 
drives are momentarily satisfied. In such a case, it becomes possible to ask, for the sake of 
asking, a question which has no specific practical application. In Schlick’s account, following 
adequate habituation, engaging in this kind of questioning can come to provide pleasure – it 
becomes a kind of game. The game is not yet Wissenschaft: in playing the game it may not 
matter whether the right answer is reached or not (e.g. 2006, 173). In Schlick’s conception, 
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the emergence of Wissenschaft is made possible by a combination of the ability to make 
predictions with the ability to enjoy playing with questions. Playing the game enough times 
may enable its players to answer some questions in a manner which has some predictive 
power. Wissenschaft gradually emerges as an attempt to answer some questions for the sake 
not of a practical goal, but of finding the truth. While the drive to pleasure in the pursuit of 
practical ends only leads to further pursuits, there is an immediate pleasure afforded by the 
pursuit of truth for its own sake.  
In Schlick’s account, knowledge can only come about through the playful pursuit of 
truth.
40
 He connects this thesis to his critical attitude towards the notion that knowledge is the 
result of work. He also presents this as his interpretation of the Nietzchean “joyful wisdom” 
of life. Schlick endorses Nietzsche’s criticism of the professionalization of knowledge, and its 
irreconcilability with the game of pursuing knowledge: 
 
The sensitive Nietzsche, who felt this disharmony perhaps especially in himself, therefore 
praises, in contrast to this unhappy practice of erudition, the “joyful Wissenschaft” of the 
wise. 
Wise is he [sic] to whom the contemplation of the world and the search for truth have 
bestowed all their blessings […] which the Play of the Spirit effuses on all who give 
themselves to it. (2006, 181, my translation) 
 
In accordance with the two later phases in Nietzsche’s work that Schlick detects in his 1912 
lectures, we can distinguish between two ways of understanding this Nietzschean “Wisdom 
of Life”.41 In his middle positivist period, as Schlick emphasises, Nietzsche develops a 
conception of scientific knowledge as an end in itself. What characterises, in Schlick’s 
account, the shift from the middle to the later period is, as we have seen, Nietzsche’s 
relativisation of the value of knowledge, which is seen in terms of its service to life. In 
Lebensweisheit, but also in later works (e.g. 1974, 94-101), Schlick’s epistemology follows 
Nietzsche into his third phase. For Schlick, the “will to truth” can only be fulfilled in making 




Even if science does not draw its conclusions for the purpose of action, the truth of its 
propositions can of course […] only be tested by the success of actions; the latter are then 
called experiments. (2006, 173, my translation). 
 
This is a position that Schlick maintained throughout his Vienna Circle years, for example in 
his most well-known contribution to the Protocol-Sentence debate in “The Foundation of 
Knowledge” from 1934.43 Here, Schlick more or less summarises his position from 1908, 
when he states that 
 
Cognition is originally a means in the service of life. In order to find his way about in his 
environment and to adjust his actions to events, man must be able to foresee these events 
to a certain extent. […] Now in science this character of cognition remains wholly 
unaltered; the only difference is that it no longer serves the purposes of life, is not sought 
because of its utility. With the confirmation of prediction the scientific goal is achieved: 
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the joy in cognition is the joy of verification, the triumphant feeling of having guessed 
correctly. And it is this that the observation statements bring about. (1959, 222-223) 
 
As has been made clear by our discussion so far, the view of joyful verification Schlick 
advances here comes from Nietzsche. It is thus perhaps fitting that the accompanying notion 




The influence of Nietzsche on Schlick is also made explicit in “On the Meaning of Life”. 
The main thesis of Schlick’s 1927 article is that the meaning of life consists in playful 
activity undertaken for its own sake. Schlick here presents his view of the meaning of life as a 
development of his engagement with Nietzsche’s response to Schopenhauer on this matter. 
Schlick’s account of the meaning of life is based on a rejection of the Schopenhauerian 
dictum that life is meaningless.
45
 Schopenhauer famously framed this contention in terms of 
the view of all action as driven by desires that unceasingly lead to further desires, and so on 
ad nauseam. Schlick seems to implicitly accept Schopenhauer’s framing of the question of 
the meaning of life, and thus it is in response to this that he searches for the answer in activity 
that is undertaken for its own sake. Schlick claims that Nietzsche’s overcoming of 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism was a predecessor to his own view of the meaning of life. He 
summarises the gist of the tripartite periodization of Nietzsche’s work he had discussed in his 
Rostock lectures, now seen as three ways of responding to pessimism: 
 
First by the flight into art: consider the world, he says, as an aesthetic phenomenon, and it 
is eternally vindicated! Then by the flight into knowledge: look upon life as an experiment 
of the knower, and the world will be to you the finest of laboratories! But Nietzsche again 
turned away from these standpoints; […]henceforth the ultimate value of life, to him, was 
life itself […] For he saw that life has no meaning, so long as it stands wholly under the 
domination of purposes. (1979a, 113) 
 
Schlick evidently develops the thought which he finds in “the wisest Nietzsche […] of 
Zarathustra” (113), explicitly connecting it to his own conception of play. Repeating, in 
brief, the outlook he had developed in 1908, Schlick defines play, explicitly against the 
ordinary usage of the term (1979a, 115), in terms of all free activities that “exist for their own 
sake and carry their satisfaction in themselves” (114), rather than existing for the satisfaction 
of some other desired end. He presents this insight as a continuation of the last stage in 
Nietzsche’s work. 
So far, I have argued for a consistent influence by Nietzsche on some of Schlick’s 
fundamental views concerning the value of knowledge and its relation to drive psychology, as 
well as his conception of play. Recent scholarship has also outlined some other aspects of 
Nietzsche’s influence on Schlick. Ferrari (2016), for example, shows that Schlick appealed to 
Nietzschean insights in rejecting the philosophy of values developed within his contemporary 
Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology. Though I will not further discuss the details of this 
view in this paper, I should here note that the same theme will appear in some of his fellow 
Vienna Circle’s members’ responses to Nietzsche, to which I now turn. 
 
7. PHILIPP FRANK ON NIETZSCHE AS AN ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHER 
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It is highly unlikely that Schlick’s work on Nietzsche was known by Philipp Frank in 1917 
when he wrote “The importance of Ernst Mach’s Philosophy of Science for our times”. Frank 
nonetheless echoes, and even amplifies, Schlick’s view of the second and third phases of 
Nietzsche’s work when he interprets Nietzsche, alongside Mach, as an Enlightenment 
thinker. Frank prefaces his discussion of their relation by noting that it concerns “the striking 
agreement of his [i.e. Mach’s] views with those of a thinker for whom he cannot have had 
any great sympathy, Friedrich Nietzsche” (Frank 1970, 232). 
The main relevant influence on Frank comes from the parallel between Mach and 
Nietzsche drawn by Hans Kleinpeter in his 1913 Der Phenomenalismus.
46
 According to 
Kleinpeter’s interpretation, which has generally been ignored by Nietzsche scholarship,47 
Mach and Nietzsche both developed phenomenalist epistemologies.
48
 Kleinpeter detects two 
epistemological principles which characterise both Nietzsche’s and Mach’s phenomenalism, 
namely: (a) the view that all knowledge is grounded in sensations, and (b) the view that all 
our concepts are mere symbols and thus ““truth” has only a relative meaning” (Gori 2012, 
343). In both philosophers’ epistemologies, there is no purely logical way of reaching out to a 
true description of the world without recourse to sensations.
49
 This, as Kleinpeter saw, meant 
that both Nietzsche and Mach were concerned with working out the consequences of this new 
anti-metaphysical (N1) “scientific philosophy” (Gori 2012, 342) (N3*).50 
Frank relies on Kleinpeter in proclaiming Nietzsche, after Mach, to be “the other great 
enlightenment philosopher of the end of the nineteenth century” (Frank 1970, 232). Frank 
uncritically repeats Kleinpeter’s view that their epistemological views are in agreement, 
despite other radical disagreements, e.g. in their very different education, “temperament” 
(1970, 232), or “ethical ideals” (232). Like Schlick, Frank calls Nietzsche “that great master 
of language” (232) in quoting, with apparent approval, a series of remarks that show 
Nietzsche to be a phenomenalist, in connection to which he rejects as metaphysical the notion 
of subjectivity and the distinction between appearance and reality.
51
 Frank describes the 
aphorism “On the Psychology of Metaphysics” as “Nietzsche’s most significant expression of 
the positivistic world conception […] where he attack[s] with cutting sharpness the 
employment of very frequently misused concepts” (232-233), i.e. the aforementioned 
metaphysical notions. Frank here clearly accepts both N1 and N3*. Though he does not 
explicitly claim that Nietzsche was a positivist, Frank does briefly note that he contributed to 
the “positivistic world conception” (232). By contrast to Schlick’s extensive defence of the 
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view that Nietzsche was a positivist, Frank’s cursory employment of the term “positivism” is 
not enough here to justify attributing to him a full-fledged endorsement of the bolder view 
N3. Frank at best seems to say that Nietzsche had positivist tendencies, and contributed to an 
overall positivistic outlook. Frank’s view is thus better understood as an endorsement of the 
weaker claim N3*. Similarly to Schlick, Frank ties N3* to N1, insofar as he sees the critique 
of metaphysics as Nietzsche’s main contribution to the positivist outlook. Furthermore, Frank 
selects a passage from Nietzsche in which his critique of metaphysics (N1) is based on an 
appeal to insights from empirical psychology (N2). 
Frank closes his comparison between Nietzsche and Mach by noting what he calls a 
“tragic feature” (233) of the enlightenment, namely that “it destroys the old systems of 
concepts, but while it is constructing a new system, it is also already laying the foundations 
for new misuse” (233). This is an unavoidable feature of scientific theory construction, in 
Frank’s view, given that it is necessary for theories to employ auxiliary concepts, which 
unavoidably will eventually be misused. In response to this phenomenon, it would be 
possible to attempt to block challenges to specific scientific views by upholding them as 
dogmas. But this would go against the spirit of the enlightenment, as championed by Mach 
and Nietzsche. As Frank sees it, both philosophers envision the enlightenment as an ongoing 
process in which the truth is perpetually sought but no perpetual truth is ever finally reached. 
Frank quotes Nietzsche’s claim that the spirit of the enlightenment concerns “the will to test, 
investigate, predict, experiment” (233), not its inhibition through some purported attainment 
of truth. Here again, Frank clearly sees Nietzsche in terms of N3*. Frank’s reference to 
experimentation is far from being an explicit acceptance of N2, yet he does make the weaker 
claim that Nietzsche had a high esteem for the methodological characteristics of empirical 
science. 
When Frank returns to this theme in introducing his 1949 book Modern Science and its 
Philosophy (in which the 1917 article is reproduced), he diagnoses that  
 
the great mass of writing on Nietzsche has overlooked the fact that he was a philosopher 
of enlightenment in his acute analysis of the auxiliary concepts of contemporary idealistic 
philosophy. (1949, 18) 
 
In this regard, one of Nietzsche’s targets, and the one that Frank presents as having turned his 
interest to him, is Kant’s view of unchanging a priori synthetic conditions for any possible 
experience. Frank presents Nietzsche as opposed to Kant’s view that there can be certain 
knowledge about such conditions, and which furthermore is not knowledge about experience: 
 
Nietzsche said flippantly that Kant’s explanation is merely equivalent to saying that man 
can do it “by virtue of a virtue”. Nietzsche accused him of demonstrating by sophisticated 
and obscure arguments that popular prejudices are right while the scientists are wrong. 
(1949, 9) 
 
Frank’s description of Nietzsche’s critique as “flippant” appears to signal that he is interested 
in the general spirit of Nietzsche’s critique of Kant, rather than its details, which he does not 
further discuss. Frank presents Nietzsche as aligned with the Vienna Circle’s overall 
appraisal of the Scientific World Conception (N3*), as opposed to Kant’s championing of 
popular prejudices. Notably, Frank’s 1917 views are mirrored in von Mises’ 1938 “Ernst 
Mach and the Scientific Conception of the World”, where Nietzsche is summarily presented 
as a critic of Kant (1970, e.g. 169) who was “in full accord with Mach’s view” (171). 
Frank’s earlier presentation of Nietzsche as an anti-metaphysical (N1) enlightenment 
thinker (N4) may be contrasted to his brief mention of Nietzsche in his well-known 
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biography of Einstein published in 1947. Frank (1947, 46-47) quotes a passage from Antonio 
Aliotta’s 1884 The Idealistic Reaction against Science, in which Nietzsche is presented as 
part of a romantic response to a seeming crisis in late nineteenth century science. In other 
words, Aliotta here rejects both N2, N3, and N3*. Aliotta sees Nietzsche, like other 
romantics, as denigrating rational thought in preference for aesthetic intuition.
52
 This 
romantic response to science’s crisis is presented by Frank as an alternative to positivist and 
pragmatist responses to the crisis, under which heading he includes, among others, the work 
of Mach. Frank notes that the positivist movement had also been perceived by some as anti-
intellectualist, but qualifies such claims by arguing that it “could be characterized as anti-
intellectual only in so far as it warned against occupying the intellect with meaningless 
problems” (1947, 47). According to Frank, the anti-metaphysical stance of late nineteenth 
century positivists like Mach should not be understood as a denigration of the powers of 
intellect; it is, instead, a correct estimation of the extent to which such issues can be 
meaningfully discussed. 
It is unclear why, whereas in 1917 Frank had thought this would be a good 
characterisation of Nietzsche’s worldview, he seems to have changed his mind in 1947, only 
to repeat his 1917 view in 1949. One possible explanation for this would be that the later 
Frank simply revised his early positive views of Nietzsche. This is further suggested by the 
fact that, in introducing the 1949 republication of the 1917 text, Frank talks of having been 
influenced by Nietzsche “at this stage” (1949, 9), possibly implying that he later overcame 
this influence. Frank does not specify a specific date range for the stage, or clarify whether he 
did change his mind about Nietzsche’s significance, and for what reason. 
Another  possible explanation for Frank’s seeming change of heart may be given by the 
subject matter of the 1947 book, namely Einstein’s life. Frank divides Einstein’s 
philosophical interests into two categories. On the one hand, there are those philosophical 
works pertaining to and influencing his scientific work, in which category Frank includes 
Mach. On the other hand, there are other works, including those of Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, which Einstein read  
 
because they made more or less superficial and obscure statements in beautiful language 
about all sorts of things, statements that often aroused an emotion like beautiful music and 
gave rise to reveries and meditations on the world. […] Einstein read these men, as he 
sometimes put it, for “edification” just as other people listen to sermons. (1947, 51) 
 
Here Frank is echoing similar remarks made by other Vienna Circle members, e.g. Feigl’s 
aforementioned remarks on Schlick’s influences, or more famously Carnap’s remarks on 
metaphysics, to which I will turn to in section 9. Before turning to Carnap, I will first look at 
various remarks on Nietzsche made by Otto Neurath. 
 
8. NEURATH ON NIETZSCHE AS PREDECESSOR OF THE VIENNA CIRCLE 
 
Neurath’s remarks on Nietzsche are quite brief, and might appear especially puzzling if not 
seen in light of his other Vienna Circle colleagues’ estimation of Nietzsche (and their varying 
degrees of commitment to N1-N3*). Yet in light of Schlick’s and Frank’s earlier appraisals of 
Nietzsche, it is clear that Neurath is simply pointing out something that is “in the air”, so to 
speak, in Vienna Circle discussions. This practice was in fact quite commonplace in 
Neurath’s modus operandi. Neurath did not work within academia, and did not follow 
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common academic citation practices; he would often respond to contemporary debates 
without citing the relevant sources.
53
 This may help explain why he is convinced of 
Nietzsche’s importance for the work of the Vienna Circle without necessarily attempting to 
demonstrate it, or to refer to relevant works that did so (e.g. Schlick’s, Frank’s, or Carnap’s). 
Neurath presents Nietzsche as a predecessor to the Vienna Circle’s anti-metaphysical 
stance (N1). This is clear e.g. in his 1935 presentation of the Vienna Circle to a French 
audience, where he plainly states that “Nietzsche and his critique of the metaphysicians took 
an active part in the flourishing of the Vienna School” (quoted in Moreira 2018, 243). A few 
pages later, listing the Vienna Circle’s influences, Neurath names “Mach, Avenarius, 
Poincare, Duhem, Abel Ray, Enriques, Einstein, Schröder, Frege, Peano, Hilbert, Russell as 
well as James and Nietzsche” (1981a, 697).54 Neurath does not further qualify his claim in 
1935, but does so in his 1936 introduction to the Vienna Circle’s ideas: 
 
Nietzsche stressed esteem for “the unpretentious truths”, objecting to the fascinating errors 
of metaphysical ages. An evolved civilization likes, according to Nietzsche, the modest 
results found by means of exact methods which are fruitful for the whole future; and such 
manliness [sic], simplicity, and temperance will characterize not only an increasing 
number but also the whole of humanity in the future. Moritz Schlick explained in a similar 
sense that the evolution of modern critical thinking is founded on an anonymous mass of 
thinkers, especially scientists, and that progress does not arise from the sensational 
philosophical systems which form an endless row, each contradicting the others. (1955, 
18). 
 
Neurath’s interpretation of Nietzsche here is unorthodox, to say the least. Along with Voltaire 
and Schlick, Neurath sees Nietzsche as championing a culture based on the communal 
activity of scientific research, as opposed to revolving around “individual philosophemes” 
(1955, 18). Though this seems to go against the grain of Nietzsche’s individualistic and elitist 
outlook, I will not here attempt to determine whether Neurath’s interpretation is plausible. 
What is perhaps most interesting in connection to this enquiry is the relation of Neurath’s 
comments to Schlick’s interpretation of Nietzsche. As noted in section 2, Schlick presents 
Nietzsche as an individual genius who attempts to overcome his cultural surroundings, 
despite the tendency of such processes of change to be slower than he envisages. On the 
contrary, Neurath claims that both Schlick and Nietzsche are paradigmatic champions of 
communal efforts, as opposed to individual genius. Neurath tells us that Schlick understands 
that “critical thinking” is not the product of individuals, but rather the result of accumulated 
effort. As shown in section 2, this is precisely the reason that Schlick gives for his claim that 
attempts to single-handedly transvaluate a culture’s values tend to fail, and also the reason 
why Schlick thinks Nietzsche was an exceptional genius who happened to succeed in such an 
attempt. 
Another parallel between Schlick’s, Frank’s (and von Mises’ (1970)), and Neurath’s 
responses to Nietzsche may be found in their interpretation of his views as anti-Kantian.
55
 
Neurath presents Nietzsche’s anti-Kantianism as part of his overall anti-metaphysical 
position. In the context of discussing the separation of specific scientific fields of study from 
“the mother-philosophy” (Neurath 1955, 10), Neurath notes that although Kant did in fact 
subsequently influence many scientists, his work also had as its effect the hindering of 
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scientific progress in some fields. Like Frank, Neurath partly attributes this understanding of 
Kant to Nietzsche: 
 
The essayist-philosopher Nietzsche showed how much of an antiscientific attitude can be 
found in Kant’s system, which reduces the power of science and thus opens the doors to 
metaphysical and philosophico-religious speculations. (1955, 11) 
 
Thus Nietzsche’s critique of Kantian metaphysics is linked by Neurath to his favouring of a 
scientific world conception (N3*). 
Neurath had elsewhere (1987, 11) presented psychology as the last of the sciences to be 
cut off from philosophy, thus resulting in the overcoming of metaphysics. Neurath describes 
Nietzsche’s contribution to this project as follows: 
  
The last science to have the umbilical cord connecting it to philosophy severed is 
psychology. And what remains behind is a dead, deaf mass. If Nietzsche stimulated 
psychologists in many ways, it was not by producing a systematic metaphysics, but 
because he was able to pursue lines of thought untrammelled by contemporary academic 
psychology, which was not interested in, e.g., “resentment”. But even a non-philosopher 
enjoys that freedom today. The end of metaphysics is demonstrable precisely in the case of 
psychology. (1987, 11) 
 
It is thus that Neurath connected Nietzsche’s psychological insights with his overcoming of 
metaphysics. Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical turn made lasting contributions to empirically-
minded psychology, in Neurath’s view. Accordingly Neurath elsewhere notes that many of 
Nietzsche’s “excellent philosophical insights” (1981b, 826) contributed both to 
psychoanalysis and to what Neurath calls “behaviouristics”. Thus Neurath not only sees 
Nietzsche as committed to N2, but also makes sense of this commitment in reference to N1. 
Neurath’s brief comments on Nietzsche are not meant to be scholarly analyses. Neurath 
does not attempt to substantiate them by reference to specific works. Most appear in 
programmatic statements of the Vienna Circle’s mission. Nonetheless, Neurath’s brief 
responses to Nietzsche play an interesting role in bringing together and unifying different 
interpretative theses (N1, N2, N3*) articulated by the Vienna Circle’s members. Neurath 
quickly outlines how Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical stance (N1) was connected to his 
understanding of psychology (N2), all in light of an overall commitment to a scientific world 
conception (N3*). These are, as I have shown, themes that are addressed by both Schlick and 
Frank, and which will also play a part in Carnap’s reception of Nietzsche, to which I now 
turn. 
 
9. CARNAP’S NIETZSCHE: THE BEGRIFFSSCHRIFT ON THE DESK, ZARATHUSTRA 
ON THE BEDSIDE TABLE? 
 
Gabriel summarises the significance of Nietzsche for Carnap (as well, perhaps, as the Vienna 
Circle in general) by noting that “for Carnap, Frege’s Begriffsschrift lies on the desk, so to 
speak, and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra on the bedside table” (2004, 12).56 Various scholars have 
highlighted the fact that Nietzsche’s influence was significant in the formation of different 
strands of the German Youth Movement, in which both Carnap and Reichenbach had 
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 The young Carnap was associated with Dilthey’s student Herman Nohl, who 
had written on Nietzsche.
58
 
Carnap’s philosophical debt to Nietzsche already manifests itself in his 1922 sketch for the 
Aufbau, titled “Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit”.59 The relevant conception of “chaos”, as it 
appears in Carnap’s title, is traceable, through various possible paths, back to Nietzsche.60 
Like Schlick, Rickert, Vaihinger, and other early readers of Nietzsche, Carnap reworks the 
Nietzschean conception of the “will to power”, which Carnap renders as the “will to order”.61 
Mormann (2006; 2016, 117-118, 121-122) has traced the transmission of influence from 
Nietzsche to Carnap via the Neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert and his critique of 
Lebensphilosophie during the early 1920s. Rickert had attempted to tame the Nietzschean 
conception of the will to power by claiming that in exact philosophy this manifests itself as a 
“will to system”.62 Philosophy’s task is to order the chaotic stream of experiences (what 
Rickert’s philosophical opponents had called “Lebens”) into a coherent and comprehensible 
system. Carnap’s “Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit” has been seen by both Mormann (2006; 
2016) and Leinonen (2016) as engaged in precisely this project, set out by Rickert, in its 
attempt to explain how the will to order is the guiding principle of the move from chaos to 
structured reality. According to Carnap, 
 
“Reality” is not given to us as something fixed, but undergoes permanent corrections. The 
epistemologist asserts: it has been built up on behalf of an accomplishment from an 
original chaos according to certain order principles that for the time being are instinctive. 
[…] The will to a new order is responsible for the epistemological considerations that deal 
with the fictions of chaos as starting point and the principles of order that guide the 
constitution. This will to order, which intends to overcome the inconsistencies of reality by 
rebuilding it in a new way, is the irrational starting point of our theory. (quoted in 
Mormann 2006, 34) 
 
Mormann (2016, 121-122) thus holds that Carnap’s “will to order” builds on Rickert’s 
unorthodox (and strictly speaking false) interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of the “will 
to power” as “will to system”. Contesting Mormann’s account, Carus (2008, 108, 125-127) 
has interpreted Carnap’s discussion of “chaos” as influenced primarily by Vaihinger.63 In 
Vaihinger’s view, the original chaos we find in the stream of our experiences is rendered 
meaningful by the fictions we impose onto them. As already noted, like Rickert, Vaihinger 
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also appeals to Nietzsche as a predecessor of his fictionalist account of the “will to 
illusion”.64 I will not attempt to resolve this dispute here; for the purposes of this article, it 
should suffice to note that, whether it is through Rickert or Vaihinger, Carnap’s conceptions 
of “chaos” and the “will to order” are ultimately traceable back to Nietzsche.65  
By contrast to Carnap’s various early sketches from the 1920s, which contain no 
references to other works, the Aufbau itself contains multiple references to Nietzsche.
66
 One 
of the central themes advanced by Nietzsche and upheld by Carnap concerns the rejection of 
the Cartesian view of subjectivity. In the various responses to Nietzsche outlined above, this 
topic is only mentioned in passing by Frank as an example of Nietzsche’s critique of 
metaphysical concepts. Carnap objects to the idea that what is given must be given to some 
subject. He quotes the following passage by Nietzsche as a source for his claim: 
 
It is merely a formulation of our grammatical habits that there must always be something 
that thinks when there is thinking and that there must always be a doer when there is a 




Carnap returns to another aspect of this same theme when he formulates his views on “the 
problem of the self” (2003, 261). This relates to Carnap’s objection against the Cartesian 
account of the self: according to Carnap, the “cogito” does not imply the “sum”. Carnap lists 
Nietzsche among a series of philosophers who had via “philosophical introspection […] 
reached the same result” (261). Carnap parallels Frank’s earlier view on the topic when he 
also includes Mach as a source for his view, noting his agreement with Nietzsche. Carnap 
also categorises some of Nietzsche’s anti-Cartesian views concerning the non-existence of 
the subject as being in agreement with Avenarius (261), Schlick (105, 261), and Russell 
(261). 
Carnap (2003, 108-109) nonetheless partly contests the Kleinpeter-Frank thesis, insofar as 
he discerns an epistemological disagreement between Mach and Nietzsche when it comes to 
the former’s atomistic rendition of phenomenalism. In selecting between the two positions, 
Carnap favours Nietzsche over Mach. Carnap’s preference for Nietzsche over Mach parallels 
a similar view by Schlick (as outlined in section 6), and in fact Carnap names Schlick (108) 
as one of his allies in his choice against Mach. In Carnap’s view, Mach naïvely endorses an 
atomistic conception of “sensations” which is incompatible with the latest advances of 
science. More specifically, Carnap refers to the results of Gestalt psychology, showing that 
the primary units of experience are not like Machian “atomic” sensations, but rather 
combined into unitary wholes. Carnap (108) refers to Nietzsche as part of a list of thinkers, 
compiled by Hans Cornelius, who had defended such views before they were experimentally 
demonstrated by psychologists. This overall attitude is similar to the one by Neurath that we 
have already examined: both Carnap and Neurath agree about N2, holding that Nietzsche was 
an important precursor of later empirically-minded experimental psychology. 
Carnap returns to Nietzsche in his famous remarks in the 1931 article “Overcoming 
Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language”.68 Here, Carnap’s overall project is 
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to demonstrate how, following various failures from previous philosophical movements 
(including the ancient skeptics, the modern empiricists, and some strands of Kantian 
thought), the newly developed method of logical analysis provides the tools for 
demonstrating that metaphysics is cognitively meaningless. Carnap shows how (i) 
metaphysical pseudo-concepts without empirical content, and (ii) metaphysical pseudo-
statements can be overcome by his recommended method. According to Carnap, 
metaphysicians had hitherto endeavoured to put forth theses that are to be shown to be either 
true or false in the course of rational theoretical debate. However, the content of their 
expressions is, according to Carnap, what he calls Lebensgefühl, i.e. a kind of emotive 
attitude towards life. Carnap thinks that such emotive attitudes should be expressed in the 
appropriate medium, which is not theoretical. Art can provide the most appropriate medium 
for expressing Lebensgefühl, since the question of whether a statement is true or false is 
irrelevant to artworks. As Dahms (2004) shows, one of the first articulations of this idea was 
presented in Carnap’s lectures at the Dessau Bauhaus.69 There, Carnap admits that after the 
misguided metaphysicians’ attempts to express their Lebensgefühl in a theoretical medium 
have been overcome, the need for expressing such Lebensgefühl in other media remains.
70
 
Carnap even encouraged the artists and designers in his audience to address this need.
71
 He 
thus portrayed the overcoming of metaphysics as a kind of liberation, freeing Lebensgefühl 
from the shackles of theory and allowing freedom for its exploration within the realm of 
artistic creation and “the conscious design of the things of [everyday] life” (quoted in Dahms 
2004, 370). 
Nietzsche is, according to Carnap, the philosopher who most clearly saw this well before it 
could be cemented by logical analysis: 
 
Our conjecture that metaphysics is a substitute, albeit an inadequate one, for art, seems to 
be confirmed by the fact that the metaphysician who perhaps had artistic talent to the 
highest degree, viz. Nietzsche, almost entirely avoided the error of that confusion. A large 
part of his work has predominantly empirical content. We find there, for instance, 
historical analyses of specific artistic phenomena, or an historico-psychological analysis of 
morals. In the work, however, in which he expresses most strongly that which others 
express through metaphysics or ethics, in Thus Spake Zarathustra, he does not choose the 
misleadingly theoretical form, but openly the form of art, of poetry. (1959a, 80) 
 
The above passage may at first appear puzzling, especially if read in isolation from other 
responses to Nietzsche by the Vienna Circle. In the first sentence, Carnap appears to suggest 
that Nietzsche is actually a metaphysician.
72
 This seems to be in tension with what follows, 
as Carnap goes on to say that Nietzsche overcomes metaphysics by altogether avoiding its 
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exposition in a theoretical medium. Should this avoidance not mean, according Carnap, that 
Nietzsche is no longer a metaphysician? 
We have already established that both Schlick and Frank had, in the preceding two 
decades, already interpreted Nietzsche as a critic of metaphysics (N1). Schlick, furthermore, 
had in 1912 already defended the tripartite view of Nietzsche’s phases, according to which, 
having overcome an initial metaphysical period, Nietzsche became a positivist (N3). This 
interpretation of Nietzsche, which was also put forth by various contemporary Nietzsche 
scholars, helps us to make sense of Carnap’s remarks. Carnap is best understood as claiming 
that Nietzsche had been a metaphysician, before he subsequently overcame metaphysics (N1) 
by dividing his work into either empirically-minded historical and psychological analyses 
(N2),
73
 on the one hand, or poetry on the other hand.
74
 As Schlick, Frank, and Neurath would 
agree, this way of overcoming metaphysics puts Nietzsche in league with the Vienna Circle, 
as one of their closest predecessors during the late nineteenth century. The Vienna Circle can 
now realise the Nietzschean project of overcoming metaphysics by putting to use the 
technical means provided by the development of modern logic. 
As already shown in section 5, Schlick had seen Zarathustra as the epitome of Nietzsche’s 
work, because it employs a poetic form that is appropriate to the subject-matter. Schlick sees 
a decline in Nietzsche’s writing that occurs in later works, which try to approach in a 
systematic manner the views initially expressed as poetry in Zarathustra. Once Carnap’s 
characterisation of Nietzsche as a metaphysician is clarified in light of Schlick’s tripartite 
scheme, i.e. as pertaining to an initial phase which Nietzsche later overcomes, it becomes 
clear that Carnap endorses the view that Zarathustra is not a work of metaphysics. Instead, 
Carnap agrees with Schlick that Zarathustra is a work which has overcome metaphysics. 
Carnap explicitly understands Zarathustra as expressing in the poetic medium what ‘others 
express through metaphysics or ethics’ (80), i.e. through a theoretical medium. In other 
words, in Zarathustra Nietzsche has overcome metaphysics by embracing the use of a non-
theoretical medium for his work. By contrast to Schlick, however, Carnap omits to mention 
the fact that Nietzsche returned to a theoretical medium after Zarathustra. As Schlick clearly 
understood, Nietzsche’s last works attempted to systematically develop what he had earlier 
expressed as poetry. Thus by contrast to Schlick, Carnap’s all too brief mention of Nietzsche 
in 1931 selectively emphasises those aspects of his thought which conveniently align with his 
project of overcoming metaphysics.
75
 
Carnap’s final mention of Nietzsche occurs in his 1932 “Psychology in Physical 
Language”. In the context of discussing “resistance to the thesis of physicalism” (1959b, 40), 
Carnap lists a number of examples in which a new theory causes a wave of controversy 
because, to quote Carnap’s Nietzschean vocabulary, “an Idol is being dethroned by it” 
(1959b, 40). Carnap’s examples include Copernicus’ heliocentrism, Darwin’s theory of 
evolution, Marx’s material explanation of causation in history, and Freud’s notion of 
unconscious drives. Nietzsche is listed among these, since as a result of his historico-
psychological analysis “the origins of morals were stripped of their halo” (Carnap 1959b, 40). 
Carnap’s thesis here is compatible with his earlier division of Nietzsche’s work into poetic art 
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works, on the one hand, and empirically-minded analyses on the other. Carnap accepts what 
he sees as Nietzsche’s empirical genealogy of morals as one among the various ground-
breaking theoretical advances that he mentions. This position again is aligned with the overall 
emphasis of N2 by Schlick and Neurath. 
Overall, Carnap’s various claims about Nietzsche, as I have shown here, can best be 
understood alongside Schlick’s, Frank’s, and Neurath’s similar statements. There is nothing 
extraordinary about Carnap’s suggestion that Nietzsche’s work was relevant to the Vienna 
Circle’s project of overcoming metaphysics. It is, rather, a kind of routine operation by which 
Carnap, like almost all other Vienna Circle members, acknowledges the significance of work 




In the above examination of Nietzsche’s reception by the Vienna Circle’s members, I have 
first of all clarified that the Vienna Circle’s responses to Nietzsche were overwhelmingly 
positive. Their championing of Nietzsche focussed on what I have summarised as a series of 
specific theses on his work (N1-N4). 
As this paper has shown, N1 was explicitly attributed to Nietzsche by Schlick, Frank, 
Neurath, and Carnap. Schlick discussed Nietzsche most extensively at a time when he 
himself was neither a positivist nor committed to the project of overcoming metaphysics tout-
court. Nonetheless, he was sympathetic to Nietzsche’s overcoming of metaphysics, which he 
understood to be the rejection of appeals to a “supersensible” (Schlick 2013, 228) world. 
Frank sees N1 in terms of Nietzsche’s rejection of “misused” (Frank 1970, 233) metaphysical 
concepts, such as the notion of subjectivity or the distinction between appearance and reality. 
Neurath explicitly presents Nietzsche as a precursor of the Vienna Circle’s proposals for 
overcoming metaphysics, tying N1 to N2 and N3*, as well as to Nietzsche’s critique of Kant. 
Carnap, finally, presents N1 in light of his interpretation of Nietzsche’s work as split between 
poetry and empirical research. Thus, while Schlick, Frank, Neurath, and Carnap agree in 
subscribing to a version of N1 broadly construed, they each emphasise different specific 
aspects of it. 
Of the different responses to Nietzsche by the Vienna Circle, it is only Schlick who 
explicitly linked Nietzsche’s turn towards N1 and N3 to his rejection of Schopenhauer’s early 
influence on his work. The others simply focus on Nietzsche’s philosophy after its turn away 
from Schopenhauerian metaphysics. Nevertheless, I have shown that Carnap’s remarks on 
Nietzsche are best understood in light of the view of Nietzsche’s rejection of Schopenhauer’s 
influence that is also put forth by Schlick. 
I have also demonstrated that N2 was explicitly acknowledged by Schlick, Neurath, and 
Carnap. Frank does not explicitly address N2, but does briefly refer to Nietzsche’s use of 
psychology in criticising metaphysics. He also connects Nietzsche’s role as an Enlightenment 
philosopher (N4) with his high esteem for the application of “the will to test, investigate, 
predict, experiment” (Frank 1970, 233). 
N3, on the other hand, was only explicitly proclaimed by Schlick. Frank and Neurath 
uphold its weaker form N3*. Frank claims that Nietzsche contributed to “the positivistic 
world conception” (Frank 1970, 232) with his attack on metaphysics, thus tying N3* to N1. 
Neurath’s portrayal of Nietzsche as endorsing a scientific conception of the world, as I have 
shown, draws various connections between N1, N2, and N3*. Both Frank and Neurath praise 
Nietzsche’s critique of Kant, which they present as having been a kind of philosophical 
impediment to the advancement of a scientific conception of the world. 
Finally, this paper has shown that the view that Nietzsche was an Enlightenment 
philosopher (N4) was explicitly articulated by Frank as well as Schlick. As highlighted 
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above, Schlick understood N4 to result from Nietzsche’s turn away from his early critique of 
the Enlightenment, and towards an anti-metaphysical positivist phase. Though the various 
brief comments by Neurath do not directly address this view of Nietzsche as an 
Enlightenment philosopher, he can be said to implicitly subscribe to the Frank/Schlick 
interpretation, insofar he sees him as an ally of the scientific world conception. 
Though most scholarly attention has focussed on Carnap’s response to Nietzsche, it is in 
various ways an outlier, as we have seen above. By contrast to Schlick, Frank, and Neurath, 
Carnap nowhere explicitly discusses the issue of Nietzsche’s relation to positivism (N3) or to 
the scientific world conception (N3*). Neither does Carnap give any indication as to whether 
he upholds N4 or not. Carnap’s discussion of Nietzsche’s views on subjectivity is not 
paralleled in other Vienna Circle texts, with the exception of a brief mention by Frank. 
Nonetheless, as this article has argued, the relation Carnap sees between Nietzsche and the 
overall project of overcoming metaphysics is best understood in light of the reception of 
Nietzsche by his Vienna Circle colleagues. The discussion in this article should at least 
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